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Wages and Labour Productivity: the role of Performance-Related Pay in Italian firms 
Mirella Damiani*, Fabrizio Pompei**, Andrea Ricci*** 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses the role of Performance Related Pay (PRP) agreements on labour 
productivity and  wages. Its main contribution is thus to investigate the effects of PRP on both 
dimensions, i.e. productivity and distribution, whereas most of the studies of related literature are 
restricted to one of those aspects.  
All estimates are performed for a large sample of manufacturing and service Italian firms with 
more than five employees and a restricted sample including only unionised firms. It allows us to 
focus on a relevant feature of industrial relations represented by worker representation and its 
role in local wage setting in the Italian economy.  
The expected positive link between PRP and firm performance has been confirmed in all 
estimates, also controlling for a rich set of covariates. Furthermore, the comparison of 
productivity estimates with those for wages allows us to ascertain that payments by results might 
be not only rent-sharing devices, but schemes that substantially lead to efficiency enhancements. 
These findings have been validated by a number of robustness checks, also taking into account 
endogeneity by using instrumental variables and the treatments of 3SLS.  
The paper argues that well designed policies, that circumvent the limited implementation of 
PRP practices, would guarantee productivity improvement. The real effectiveness of these 
measures would not be weakened under union governance. 
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1.Introduction1 
During the last years, the efficiency performance of the Italian economy has been 
disappointing, even in comparison to other European economies (Daveri and Jona-Lasinio 2005; 
Damiani, Pompei and Ricci, 2011). In the same years, the share of national income accruing to 
employees has recorded large falls, as documented by OECD (2012, ch. 3). This paper examines 
the drivers of both evidence by testing whether the insufficient room given to performance 
related payments (PRP) in decentralised bargaining has a say on efficiency and distributive 
patterns recorded in the Italian economy. 
As known, in the last few years, “the centre of gravity in decision-making on employment 
contracting, wages and human resources has moved – to a smaller or larger extent – closer to the 
firm (European Commission, 2011, p. 9). This trend towards decentralisation of wage setting has 
been associated with the increasing use of variable pays, such as Performance Related Pay, to 
provide an important element of flexibility and more closely links to individual or collective 
performance. However, this trend has shown great variability across EU economies and appears 
limited in the Italian economy, thus insufficient to foster adequate efficiency gains and not 
capable to offer bonuses linked to firm performance.  
This paper is the first to investigate for the Italian economy the effects of PRP on both these 
dimensions, i.e. productivity and distributive implications, whereas most of the studies of related 
literature are restricted to one of those aspects (Gielen, Kerkhofs and Van Ours, 2009). With our 
empirical strategy, comparing estimates for impacts of PRP on productivity and wages, we verify 
whether PRP schemes have lead to efficiency enhancements or broaden the space for local rent-
sharing. 
The paper also focuses on a relevant feature of quality of industrial relations, represented by 
the presence of unions. The impact exerted by unions, as summarised in Bryson and Forth 
(2010), depends on their influence in promoting more efficient management, through their ‘voice’ 
function, but also on extracting union wage premiums, as predicted by monopoly union 
bargaining models. This seems relevant in a highly unionised economy, such as the Italian case 
and particularly valuable because, up to now, international evidence shows contradictory findings, 
and the effects of unions on pay settings and productivity are still ambiguous. Thus our case 
study commands attention to researchers interested to further verify the role of workers’ 
representation and PRP. 
We use a unique dataset for the Italian economy obtained from the ISFOL Employer and 
Employee Surveys (2005, 2007, 2010) which collect information at firm level for both 
manufacturing and services sectors and for enterprises with more than five employees, whereas 
other studies on Italy are more limited in scope, because restricted to large size firms or focused 
on specific sectors. This rich dataset permits to explore the relationship between PRP and 
efficiency (labour productivity and total factor productivity growth), and to provide estimates for 
the effects of PRP on wages, also controlling for an ample set of covariates2.  
In the econometric analysis, various robustness checks have been performed and the main 
results have been validated by instrumental variable estimates. Furthermore, additional checks 
have been carried out by the treatments of Three- Stage Least Square (3SLS), assuming that the 
same instrument is valid for both labour productivity and wages. This method can be more 
efficient and its relative advantage increases when the interrelations among the error terms are 
higher.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A preliminary version of this paper has been presented at the Workshop, Industrial Relations, Productivity and Growth 
in Italy, organized by AISRI and AIEL, University of Rome, La Sapienza, 18October 2013. We especially thank the 
discussant, Enrico Saltari. We also thank Nicola Acocella and Riccardo Leoni and participants to the workshop for their 
useful comments. 
2The determinants of decentralised bargaining and of bargaining covering PRP have been estimated on the basis of the 
ISFOL surveys for 2005 and 2007 by Damiani and Ricci (forthcoming). 
 
3	  
	  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses related literature. Section 3 
presents data and offers descriptive statistics. Section 4 illustrates the econometric framework 
and estimation results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Related literature 
One of the key characteristics of compensation systems concerns fixed or variable payments, 
i.e. payments linked to worker input or to worker performance. (Lazear, 1995). The properties of 
these alternative options are still under debate since up to now neither these payment types 
produces universally superior results (Belfield and Marsden 2003). We offer additional evidence 
by focussing on output- based pay, such as PRP, that may be individual or collective.  
PRP, that is output-based (performance-based) pay, by linking wages to individual 
performance, is expected to increase productivity through higher motivation and innovation. 
Indeed, individual performance pay is held to generate beneficial effects in the form of higher 
effort and work quality, higher commitment and incentives to firm-specific human capital 
(Prendergast, 1999). In addition, pay settings that change from rewards based on input measures 
to payments related to output outcomes may induce dramatic improvements in production, 
which may be explained by two factors that have equal impacts. The first is that this policy 
attracts workers of greater ability (Lazear, 2000). The second is that contingent contracts are 
effective in contexts in which output (but not effort) is observable by the employer because such 
contracts encourage more effort and mitigate the agency problem.  
However, controversial aspects of individual incentives are conceivable. For instance, 
Bandiera et al. (2005) show that employees underperform when wages are linked to relative 
performance, since workers whose efforts impose negative externalities on their fellows 
internalize fear retaliation. In another study, Bandiera et al. (2010) examine the importance of 
social ties across workers and find positive spill-over effects where social ties exist, as a given 
worker’s productivity is significantly higher when that person works together with friends, 
especially those who are more able. In order to motivate workers, firms may therefore choose to 
exploit social incentives as an alternative to monetary incentives. 
Another controversial aspect arises from the possible trade-off between extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivations, since contingent rewards may conflict with intrinsic motivation, so impairing 
performance (Benabou and Tirole, 2003). 
Economic theory is also ambiguous as to the expected impact of PRP in the form of collective 
bonuses on productivity. These bonuses, such as profit sharing, favour better teamwork, greater 
workforce cooperation in facing new technology and organizational changes and these collective 
incentive schemes are more likely to be offered when total output is the result of the efforts of 
many agents and individual contributions cannot easily be identified (Holmstrom, 1979; Fitzroy 
and Kraft, 1992). In such cases, the absence of group incentives may lead to inferior Nash 
equilibria, associated with low levels of productivity due to limited cooperation. By contrast, 
employees who participate to enterprise results “will become more committed to the goals of that 
enterprise, leading to improvements in individual and organisational performance. At a wider 
societal level, financial participation may be seen as a tool for redistribution of income and 
wealth, and may therefore serve as a broader instrument for social integration” (Pendleton et al. 
2001, p.1).  
However, collective bonuses may induce employees to free ride on the efforts of others and 
cut productivity. In such circumstances, group incentives may lead to decentralised monitoring 
due to peer pressure and shame norms (Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Mas and Moretti, 2009), thus 
mitigating opportunistic behaviour. More generally, the promotion of team culture and employee 
participation in decision-making, reveals a policy which contributes, like financial participation, to 
increasing commitment (Blinder, ed., 1990).  
On empirical grounds, the summary paper of Pérotin and Robinson reported ‘very solid 
international evidence’ that employee financial participation has a positive or neutral effect on 
productivity. In more recent works, productivity effects of collective PRP have been tested in a 
number of studies (Kruse, Blasi and Park, 2008; Bryson and Freeman; 2008; Gielen, Kerkhofs 
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and Van Ours, 2009; Kato, Lee and Ryu, 2012,). However, the number of contribution that 
estimate productivity effects by using representative firm surveys are still smaller. Particularly 
valuable is to highlight the incentive experience in Italy, because prior works for this country 
have been restricted to large companies, selected sectors or particular areas in the north of the 
country (Origo, 2009; Lucifora and Origo, 2012). 
In addition, what deserve closer attention are the main impacts of PRP on wage setting. In 
decentralised wage-bargaining, workers, through PRP, can appropriate a large part of the rents 
generated by their firms. One interpretation of the positive wage premium negotiated in firm-
level contracts is that of rent-sharing. This may be relevant when specific human capital is 
important and there is “a match-specific surplus (rent), created by the costs of finding new 
partners, and this surplus will have to be shared by bargaining” (Acemoglu and Piscke, 1999, p. 
F121). Some authors, by using firm-level data, show a robust positive association between wages 
and profitability (see, among others, Abowd and Lemieux, 1993; Blanchflower, Oswald, and 
Sanfey, 1996). This evidence has been confirmed by introducing controls for unobserved worker 
heterogeneities (Gurtzen, 2008; Martins, 2009).  
However, how much of these wage effects are due to the presence of unions is still uncertain. 
On one hand, trade unions have sufficient bargaining power to obtain high wage premiums with 
firm-level agreements and favourable conditions from local contracts. One potential result is to 
strengthen the pay-performance link, as in rent-sharing models (Blanchflower, Oswald, and 
Sanfey 1996). On the other hand, unionised plants are more likely to utilise incentive payments 
accompanied by joint decision-making, leading to better results in terms of firm performance 
(Black and Lynch, 2001). In unionised firms, constructive institutional responses overcome free 
rider problems of group incentives, increase workers’ commitment and reduce voluntary labour 
turnover (Booth and Chatterji, 1998). Accordingly, the two impacts, on efficiency and wages, may 
reveal to a large extent, inseparable, as shown by Addison and Belfield (2007). Furthermore, as 
signalled by incentive contract literature, clusters of complementary human resource management 
(HRM) practices may exert significant effects on productivity. For the Italian case, Leoni (2012) 
has shown that also skill improvements and workers’ skill competence, that result in more 
efficient production, can be obtained from specific high performance work practices, especially 
when adopted in a bundled form. 
Other studies have shown that the set of HRM variables includes union relations, as tested in 
the representative study of Ichniowsky, Shaw and Prennushi, 1997). Even in low unionised 
economies, such as the UK, there is also new evidence that worker representatives are perceived 
by employers as institutions capable of improving firm performance (Bryson and Forth, 2010). 
We will address these issues in the econometric section. 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
3.1 Data  
Our empirical analysis is based on information obtained by the Employer and Employee 
Surveys (RIL) that were conducted by ISFOL in 2005, 2007 and 2010 on a representative sample 
of partnerships and limited firms that operated in the non-agricultural private sector.  
The ISFOL-RIL surveys collect a rich set of information about employment composition, 
personnel organization, industrial relations and other workplace characteristics. In particular, the 
RIL questionnaire provides information about the adoption of decentralised bargaining and PRP, 
as well as the presence of unions (see the Appendix, Table A1, for detailed definitions of all 
variables). Each RIL cross-section for the years 2005, 2007 and 2010 counts about 25000 firms, 
whereas its longitudinal component over the period 2005-2007-2010 counts about 12000 firms. 
As far as PRP is concerned, each firm is asked whether or not such a scheme is adopted. 
Unfortunately, we do not know whether the different types of schemes are based on firm-, 
group- or individual- performance (this information is available only for 2010). Besides, the 
dataset does not provide statistics on how many workers in the firm receive PRP. Therefore, our 
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PRP-variable is a dummy variable simply indicating the existence or not of a PRP scheme of 
some kind. 
In order to link information concerning workers’ characteristics to indicators of firm 
performance and accounting variables, a sub-sample of the RIL dataset was merged with balance-
sheet information from the AIDA archive. Then the longitudinal RIL-AIDA merged sample is 
restricted to those limited liability companies which operated in the Italian private sector over the 
period 2005-2010. Further, we excluded firms with less than five employees to retain only those 
firms characterized by a minimum level of organizational structure. The final sample is given by a 
no-balanced panel of about 9000 firms during the period 2005-2010. 
 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
In this section, we perform a descriptive analysis of the RIL-AIDA merged sample for the 
years 2005, 2007 and 2010. Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations for the key 
variables used in the econometric analysis. The number of sampled firms increases from 8064 to 
10136 over the period analysed. This time variability suggests to be cautious in discussing 
summary statistics, even though the variability is not so important and the composition effects 
should be limited. The results show that in 2005, 2007 and 2010, only 15%, 12% and 14% of 
firms, respectively, have PRP schemes, thus confirming the limited spread of PRP agreements 
and no significant changes over the observed period3.  
The RIL AIDA merged sample also reveals a rather slight increase in the two dependent 
variables (labour productivity and wages), and in the physical capital per employees between 2005 
and 2010.  
With respect to workforce composition, Table 1 shows that the share of blue-collar workers 
increases over time, from 46% in 2005 to 55% in 2010, while, symmetrically, the proportion of 
white collars decreases from 45% in 2005 to 39% in 2010.   
Concerning the percentage of women, workers with fixed-term contracts and immigrants 
(workers coming from other countries), a slight decrease over time is recorded, indicating a 
tendency in our sample towards the reduction of ‘peripheral’ employment: on average, the 
proportion of women decreases from 39% to 35% from 2005 to 2010; analogously, the stock of 
workers with fixed-term contracts over the total employment is declining from 11% in 2005 to 
10% in 2010, and the share of immigrants, on total employees, declines from 9% to 5%. The 
overall weakness in productivity and wage growth of sampled firms may be explained by the 
lowering of both innovative and exporting units over the period considered .Firms that originate 
new products decline from 55% to 45%, whereas the proportion of exporters slumps from 41% 
to 31%, between 2005 and 2010. 
As we will discuss in the next section, sale volatility recorded in two different previous periods 
will be used as instruments, supporting in the econometric analysis our robustness check. What 
matters here, is that this average previous volatility of sales is remarkable over the sample (the log 
of the standard deviation ranges from 12.55 to 12.90). This information,  available only for a 
restricted sub-sampled firms (about 4.000 observations per year), allows us to control for 
endogeneity and lead us to confirm all our main results. 
According to expectations, in our sample small-size firms prevail and the largest share of firms 
is mainly located in Northern Italy. In particular, firms with less than 50 employees are more than 
80% while those with more than 250 employees are about 5% of the total sample in each year 
considered. Finally the RIL-AIDA data indicate that firms are mainly specialised in 
manufacturing sectors and less present in services, with the exception of the trade sector.  
These differentials in territorial localisation and sectors of the Italian firms, as well as in 
various characteristics of workforce composition, show the importance of our data for analysing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For critical analyses of the Italian bargaining model and the reforms adopted in the last years see Acocella and Leoni (2010) 
and Tronti (2010). 
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the use of PRP, whereas other (few) studies using firm level data are very often limited to smaller 
samples, restricted by sector, geographical localisation and size (Origo, 2009; Lucifora and Origo, 
2012).. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Finally notice that PRP firms, that are scarcely widespread, exhibit better performances and 
pay higher wages, at least according to the key indicators used in our empirical analysis The 
Kernel density estimations, calculated on the pooled sample, show that there is higher probability 
to find PRP firms among firms with higher values of labour productivity and wages. As shown by 
Figure 1, the distribution referring to PRP firms is slightly placed to the right of that concerning 
other firms. This difference is recorded in the whole sample and is confirmed in the restricted 
sample that includes only unionised firms.  
These first comparisons of firms that have a PRP scheme with respect those that have not, 
encourage us to further explore the existence of possible causal relations between PRP schemes 
and enterprise performance. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
4. Estimates 
4.1 The econometric strategy 
In this section we present the empirical strategy aimed at estimating the effect of PRP on 
labour productivity and wages.  
In particular, the relationship between labour productivity and PRP may be formalized by a 
production function augmented by a dummy variable capturing the incidence of PRP and 
inserting a set of other controls for firm characteristics and workforce composition. The 
following equation is then estimated: 
(1)     t=2005,2007, 2010 
 
where 𝑙𝑛 !! !,! is the (log of) valued added per employee, is the (log of) physical 
capital per employee, PRP represents a dummy variable indicating the presence of PRP and the 
vector Xit denotes other controls for workforce composition and firm characteristics. Finally, the 
parameter ms denotes sector specific fixed effects, gj  regional (NUTS1_level) fixed effects for 
macro-areas,  represents year fixed effects and  is the error term capturing the idiosyncratic 
component of labour productivity. 
The wage equation parallels the productivity equation (1).  Thus, estimate the following 
equation: 
 
(2)          t=2005,2007, 2010 
 
where the dependent variable represents the (log of) the average annual wages (W) per 
employee (L), while the explanatory variables are the same included in equation (1): 
 
is the (log of) physical capital per employee, PRP represent a dummy variable indicating the 
presence of PRP and the vector Xit denotes the controls for workforce composition and firm 
characteristics discussed in the previous section. The parameter ms denotes sector specific fixed 
effects, gj the regional (NUTS1_level) fixed effects for macro-areas,  represents the year fixed 
effect and  is the error term. 
ittjsitit
itit
XPRP
L
K
L
P
εηγµδβα +++++⋅+⋅+⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛⋅=⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛ lnln
itL
K
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ln
tη itε
ittjsitit
itit
XPRP
L
K
L
W
εηγµδβα ++++⋅+⋅+⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛⋅=⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛ lnln
itL
K
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ln
tη
itε
7	  
	  
Afterwards, the econometric strategy tackles the question of endogeneity of PRP on 
productivity and wages. We started with a pooled cross section analysis of equations (1) and (2), 
controlling for time dummies fixed effects. However, pooled regressions do not allow us to 
distinguish between incentive or distributive effects of PRP and spurious correlation between 
PRP and productivity (or wages), that will typically arise if more productive firms and firms that 
pay higher wages more likely adopt PRP schemes. As a result of this potential endogeneity of 
PRP variable, the estimated effect of PRP would be biased.  
To deal with endogeneity, we use the feasible two step IV-GMM estimator on the pooled data 
2005-2007-2010 for equation (1) and (2). Baum et al. (2003 and 2007), demonstrated that when 
the disturbance covariance matrix is affected by heteroskedasticity and observations are clustered 
(we have firms in three different time periods) this GMM estimator is more efficient and emerges 
as useful alternative to the standard fixed IV estimators4. As instruments, we use firm-level values 
of the volatility of sales recorded in two past periods: i) the three years 1999, 2000, 2001, and ii) 
the three years 2002, 2003, 2004. Lagged values of volatility of sales is a proxy of uncertainty 
faced by firms, and it is expected to be correlated with the probability that firms introduce PRP 
schemes as incentive -sharing devices over the period 2005-2007-2010, as explained below (see 
the sub-section 4.3). At the same time, lagged values of sale volatility are supposed to be not 
correlated with current values of labour productivity and wages5. Unfortunately, the volatility of 
sales is not available for all firms used in the baseline estimation, hence the robustness checks are 
performed on a restricted sample. For that reason there will be a variation in the magnitude of 
coefficients of main interest, but not in sign and significance, but our main results are confirmed. 
Furthermore, we use a 3SLS estimation in which the two dependent variables (labour 
productivity and wages) are explicitly taken to be endogenous to the system and treated as 
correlated with disturbances in the system of equations.  
In this context, also our key variable PRP is treated as endogenous and correlated with 
disturbances, while other control variables included in the right-hand side of the system of 
equations (1)-(2) are considered to be exogenous. Then we perform a 3SLS-IV regression to 
estimate a SUR model of equations (1) and (2) using as instruments for PRP the (lagged) values 
of sale volatility for each firm. In this empirical framework, the estimated coefficient of PRP in 
the wage equation (2) may be compared to that estimated in productivity equation (1). It allows 
us to verify if the relative bargaining power of firms and workers affects the division of the social 
surplus obtained from the employment relationship. 
 
 
4.2 Effects of PRP: OLS estimates 
In this section we estimate the effect of PRP on productivity and wages of Italian firms. The OLS 
estimates are presented in Table 2 and are obtained by including time, regional (NUTS, the 
Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics, Level-1) and sector dummies, to control for time- 
varying, geographical disparities and highly sector-specific factors which probably influenced the 
dependent variables and which cannot be captured by means of controls included in our analysis. 
Due to multicollinearity problems we could not introduce the firm size as regressor. However, 
both literature concerning Italian firms (Hall et al., 2009) and our own calculations report a good 
correlation between export and innovation propensities, on one side , and firm size on the other. This 
evidence led us to consider these propensities as good proxies of the firm size6. 
[Insert Table 2] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 To save space we do not show the results of tests proving the presence of heteroskedasticity in our estimated equations. 
These results are available upon request. 
5 Among rationales behind the choice of our instrument, one may recall some results of the strategic management and sales 
management literatures. For instance, the use of an incentive plan is positively related to a dimension of organizational 
performance, such as sales volatility, as found by Menguc and Barkers (2003). Other arguments for the correlation between 
variable pay and profit volatility are offered by Burke and Hsieh (2006). 
6 Results concerning these correlations, found in our sample, are available upon request. 
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The first two columns report the results obtained for the whole sample of firms, unionised and 
not, and the remaining columns those for the sub-sample of unionised firms. Thus, the comparison 
among these different results indicates productivity and wage differences between firms that have 
unions and all sampled firms7.  
The findings obtained indicate that the effect of PRP is positive and significant on labour 
productivity (column a). An analogous results has been obtained by replicating our estimation strategy 
for wages, (column b). These findings are confirmed also for unionised firms (columns c and d), even 
though differences in the magnitude of some effects deserve a short discussion. As regards wages, the 
lower coefficient on PRP for unionised firms might indicate that other actors, not only managers and 
employees, considerably influence the use of performance related pays and that productivity gains are 
not fully appropriated by workers. Indeed, under unions, PRP schemes represent ‘shared capitalist 
plans’ of compensation, that enable employers to secure benefits, as documented for other countries 
by the employee financial participation literature (see, among others, Poutsma, Blasi and Kruse, 2012). 
Our result may also be interpreted as a confirmation that in years of progressive decline in trade union 
membership and diffusion of precarious working conditions, unions’ objective function has been 
more oriented to wage moderation to preserve job positions. Thus employees’ representatives have 
exerted their bargaining power to moderate wage demands, as also shown for other country 
experiences (Dumont et al. 2005). 
Most of the control variables show the expected sign. We find the significant and positive role of 
the capital stock per capita in both labour productivity and wage equations, whereas concerning 
workforce characteristics we obtain the strong negative coefficient associated with the percentage of 
women. A cautionary interpretation is necessary, since the percentage of women is very likely to be 
correlated with unobserved (or omitted) firm characteristics. In addition, the negative coefficient 
associated with the female component is likely to be related to the gender wage gap. Indeed, our wage 
estimates (columns b and d) seem to confirm that lower productivity increases, obtained when the 
proportion of women is higher, is at least partially related to less generous remunerations offered to 
women. It is in line with other studies that find that female employees, on average, prefer activities 
that allow a larger flexibility between job and family, have lower interdependence with other workers, 
are less involved in participative work forms (Zwick, 2004), and appear less respondent to incentives.  
Another interesting finding is the negative coefficient of fixed-term workers on labour productivity 
(columns a and c), accompanied by a parallel segmentation of these precarious workers in wage setting 
(column b and d). Other workers’ characteristics, such as employment positions, play a role: the 
coefficient associated to white- and blue-collar workers are negative and significant, with respect to 
the omitted category, the executives. A plausible explanation is that managerial employees have a 
positive and significant influence on productivity,. This may be due to their providing better-designed 
pay schemes to induce optimal effort from their subordinates.  
Finally, the propensity to export has a positive and significant influence on both productivity and 
wages, and probably it also works as a good proxy of medium and large sized firms. 
 
 
4.3 IV and 3SLS estimates 
 
The possible endogeneity of PRP deserves further attention. The exogeneity assumption of PRP 
might be violated if firms adopt this reward system on the basis of productivity performance, as said 
above. In other terms, enterprises with PRP might be more efficient in advance (and may offer higher 
rewards) than firms that don’t have a scheme. This problem, due to the fact that better managed firms 
tend to adopt PRP, is taken into account carrying out instrumental variable estimates and implementing 
some tests to validate the choice of these instruments.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 It must be remarked that the comparison of coefficients of PRP on productivity and wages has only an approximate value 
and are not totally reliable because the results shown in columns (a), (b) and (c), (d) are obtained by estimating different 
equations. Only in the 3SLS model they are obtained from a unique system of equations and in this case the comparison has 
a full validity.  
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This method requires finding instruments that can predict PRP, without directly affecting our 
dependent variables, labour productivity and wages. The volatility of sales, recorded in past years before 
2005, may be a valid instrument because it is not correlated with our dependent variables, but at the 
same time, may influence our key regressor PRP.  
Notice that Italy is characterized by a two-tiered bargaining regime: at the first level there is an 
industry-wide bargaining; at the second level there is a firm level (or territorial) bargaining, that may 
distribute PRP wage premiums linked to productivity or firm results. In this wage setting, the design of 
the PRP wage component means that it can only improve the wage set in the first level, or be zero 
when targets on productivity or firm results are not met. In other words, wage negotiations at the firm 
level mostly concern production bonuses that employers pays to workers when the firm experiences 
upturns; on the contrary, no penalisation is envisaged for workers’ rewards during downturns. Thus, it 
is plausible to assume that Italian firms and workers, that underwent higher sales volatility in the past, 
are more willing to adopt a PRP scheme, because PRP can lead to an increase in motivation, employee 
performances and wages. By contrast, no losses are associated with high volatility of sales because 
employees do not take extra-risks, and when the volatility of sales is high also risk-averse employees will 
be no reluctant to accept PRP agreements. 
The conjecture above seems to be confirmed: we performed the IV-GMM regression by introducing 
in the first stage, as external instruments of PRP, the volatility of sales recorded at firm level over the 
period 1999-2001, and 2002-2004 (see Table A.2, in the Appendix, for the first-stage results). We 
obtain that both our instruments positively influence the adoption of the PRP scheme. 
In the second stage, we obtain the results reported in Table 3. Similarly as done in Table 2, for each 
dependent variable we ran two specifications, the first for the whole sample (first two columns) and the 
second for the unionised firms (remaining columns). 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
By using the IV-GMM estimates, the coefficients of PRP, instrumented with the volatility of sales, 
show the expected sign and are significantly different from 0. The validity of the external instruments is 
signalled by three different tests: under-identification, weak-identification and over-identification 
(Baum, 2003; 2007). The only exception is the productivity equation for the sample of unionised firms 
(Table 3, column c), where the tests of joint validity of the chosen instruments is at the limit (see the p-
value for the Hansen J Statistic). In any case, the instrumentation of PRP is validated by the 
productivity estimation concerning the whole sample (column a). 
To have a confirmation of our results, an additional robustness check has been performed in Table 
4, by the treatment of Three-Stage Least Squares estimator (3SLS), that is a combination of multivariate 
regression (Sur estimation, see Zellner and Theil, 1962 for its properties) and Two-Stage Least Squares 
method. Indeed, if the dependent variables are somehow correlated each other, as in our case, one has 
to control for the variance-covariance matrix of error terms by means of simultaneous equations. 
In the first stage we use the instruments of PRP, shown above: i) volatility of sales at firm level over 
the period 1999-2001; ii) volatility of sales at firm level over the period 2002-2004. In the Second-Stage, 
a consistent estimate for the covariance matrix of the equation disturbances is obtained; whereas in the 
Third-Stage a GLS-type estimation is performed by using the covariance matrix estimated in the second 
stage and with the instrumented values in place of the right-hand-side endogenous variables.  
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
 
The last row shows the total correlation between each pair of equations that justifies the use of the 
covariance matrix of the disturbances, performed with the Seemingly Unrelated Regression Method. In 
addition, we can make a proper comparison of the PRP coefficients of the productivity and wage 
equations, respectively. The Wald test tells us that these coefficients are statistically different in both 
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samples (All Firms and Unionised Firms). We obtain that the coefficient of PRP on wages is still slight 
lower in unionised firms with respect to all firms (0.838 versus 0.864), even though unions play a role in 
limiting the extraction of surplus accruing to employers via the adoption of PRP. Indeed, the positive 
difference between the PRP coefficients of productivity and wage equations is only 0.330 in unionised 
firms, whereas it goes up to 0.425 in all firms. 
In any case, what is worth noting in Table 4 is that our previous findings still hold and suggest the 
positive link of PRP with pays and performances.  
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has analysed the role of the implementation of decentralised bargaining in explaining the 
recent slow-down of the Italian efficiency growth, with a particular focus on the role played by the 
(limited) diffusion of Performance Related Pay (PRP) agreements on labour productivity. We obtained 
that PRP may significantly stimulate efficiency gains and thus the limited implementation of these wage 
practices has played a role in explaining the Italian disappointing results. 
The paper has also addressed distributive concerns exploring how PRP schemes bargained in local 
wage setting contributed to explain wages, and thus have a say on distributive patterns recorded in the 
Italian economy in the last few years.  
All estimates are performed for a large sample of manufacturing and service Italian firms that 
employ more than 5 workers and controlling for a rich set of covariates. Furthermore, to validate our 
OLS results, various robustness checks have been performed, by IV-GMM estimates and the 
treatments of 3SLS, assuming that the same instrument is valid for every equation, labour productivity 
and wages. In addition, we focused on a relevant feature of industrial relations, represented by 
unionization. The results indicate that unions, not only extract wage premiums for their workers, as 
predicted by monopoly union bargaining models, but through their ‘voice’ function, may counter-
balanced negative side-effects of collective PRP, such as free-riding. Overall, the estimates suggest that 
workers’ organisations play a redistributive function that reveals not detrimental to an efficiency- 
enhancing role.  
Concerning policy implications, the adoption of measures that circumvent the limited 
implementation of PRP practices may be recommended, since payments by results, rather than being 
only distributive devices, may substantially lead to efficiency enhancements. The effectiveness of this 
strategy is not weakened under union governance. 
The main limitation of our findings concerns PRP data. Unfortunately, we know whether the 
different types of schemes are based on firm-, group- or individual- performance only for 2010, but this 
information is not available for previous years8 and the dataset does not provide statistics on how many 
workers in the firm receive PRP, nor for indicators chosen to link pays to performance. Furthermore, 
we only investigated the average effect of PRP on productivity and wages, by considering the standard 
conditional mean econometric techniques. We expect that additional results could be obtained taking 
into account the heterogeneity of firms along the productivity and wage distributions by means of 
quantile regression techniques. 
Future research, made available also by additional statistical information, will permit to explore the 
role of individual and collective variable payment schemes on the basis of a richer dataset and to 
thoroughly evaluate their different influence on efficiency gains and redistribution inside heterogeneous 
Italian firms. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The availability of data concerning the diffusion of PRP  schemes offered at the individual, team, or establishment level 
has been exploited by Damiani and Ricci (2013), with a specific focus on the role played by of the quality of managers, 
captured by their educational profile. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics: RIL-AIDA merged sample 
 Year 2005 Year 2007  Year 2010  
 N. Mean Std .  Dev .  N. Mean Std .  Dev .  N. Mean Std .  Dev .  
Performance Related Pay 8064 0.15  8362 0.12  10136 0.14  
Accounting variables          
ln (value added per capita) 5291 10.66 0.77 7512 10.73 0.62 9069 10.69 0.61 
ln (wage per capita) 5241 9.93 0.66 7451 9.99 0.42 9060 10.01 0.43 
ln (physical capital per capita) 5294 9.80 1.6 7507 9.85 1.58 9054 9.90 1.76 
Workforce characteristics          
% executives 8064 0.09 0.13 8551 0.05 0.1 10136 0.05 0.1 
% white collar workers 8064 0.45 0.32 8551 0.38 0.31 10136 0.39 0.31 
% blue-collar workers 8064 0.46 0.32 8551 0.57 0.33 10136 0.55 0.33 
% women 8064 0.39 0.28 8580 0.34 0.28 10136 0.35 0.28 
% fixed-term contracts 8064 0.11 0.16 8580 0.1 0.17 10136 0.10 0.17 
% immigrant workers 8064 0.09 0.18 8301 0.06 0.12 9955 0.05 0.11 
Firm characteristics          
Age 5261 22.45 16.83 6585 24.13 16.90 4870 26.70 17.23 
Process Innovation 7775 0.47 0.50 8169 0.43 0.50 9920 0.39 0.49 
Product Innovation 7820 0.55 0.50 8184 0.56 0.50 9926 0.45 0.50 
Export 8064 0.41 0.49 8360 0.30 0.39 9944 0.31 0.46 
ln (Sales volatility)_1999-2001 3924 12.63 1.65 4940 12.56 1.65 3431 12.55 1.64 
ln (Sales volatility)_2002-2004 2887 12.87 1.47 3600 12.82 1.47 2416 12.90 1.43 
Firm Size          
5 <  n of employees<15 8064 0.38  8551 0.42  10136 0.43  
15 ≦n employees < 50 8064 0.35  8551 0.34  10136 0.33  
50 ≦ n employees < 250 8064 0.21  8551 0.19  10136 0.19  
n of employees ≧250 8064 0.07  8551 0.05  10136 0.05  
NUTS1_Macro-regions 8064      10136   
North- West 8064 0.35  8580 0.34  10136 0.33  
North-East 8064 0.25  8580 0.26  10136 0.25  
Centre 8064 0.2  8580 0.2  10136 0.21  
South 8064 0.21  8580 0.21  10136 0.21  
Sectors 8064      10136   
Textile, Wearing Apparel, Food Industry 8064 0.14  8580 0.14  10136 0.14  
Other Manufacturing, Mining, Utilities 8064 0.28  8580 0.31  10136 0.31  
Constructions 8064 0.11  8580 0.1  10136 0.1  
Trade, hotels, restaurants 8064 0.13  8580 0.16  10136 0.16  
Transportation and communication 8064 0.07  8580 0.05  10136 0.05  
Intermediation and other business 
service 8064 0.14  8580 0.1  10136 0.1  
Education, health and private social 
services 8064 0.12  8580 0.14  10136 0.14  
Notes: for binary variables and dummies the mean corresponds to the relative frequency. 
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Figure 1: Distributions of Wages, Labour Productivity and Total Factor Productivity  
Labour Productivity (All Firms) Labour Productivity (Unionised Firms) 
  
Wages (All Firms) Wages (Unionised Firms) 
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Table 2: Effects of Performance Related Pay on Labour Productivity, Wages and TFP 
(OLS Estimates) 
 
	  	   All Firms Unionised Firms 
Dependent Variable 
ln (value added 
per capita)  
ln (wage per 
capita) 
ln (value added 
per capita)  
ln (wage per 
capita) 
Explanatory Variables a b c d 
Performance Related Pay 0.069*** 0.088*** 0.072*** 0.049*** 
  (0.017) (0.011) (0.021) (0.014) 
ln (physical capital per capita) 0.144*** 0.061*** 0.133*** 0.059*** 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) 
Fixed-term contracts_Share -0.416*** -0.430*** -0.239*** -0.410*** 
  (0.039) (0.035) (0.083) (0.085) 
White Collars_share -0.452*** -0.390*** -1.027*** -0.903*** 
	  	   (0.087) (0.077) (0.206) (0.158) 
Blue Collars_share -0.756*** -0.626*** -1.329*** -1.141*** 
  (0.086) (0.075) (0.199) (0.148) 
Women_share -0.374*** -0.378*** -0.462*** -0.371*** 
  (0.026) (0.021) (0.055) (0.039) 
Immigrants -0.128*** -0.131*** 0.125 0.033 
  (0.045) (0.040) (0.098) (0.084) 
Firm's Age 0.001 0.002*** 0.000 0.001*   
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Process Innovation 0.005 -0.014 0.016 -0.023 
  (0.012) (0.009) (0.022) (0.017) 
Product Innovation 0.002 0.014 0.011 0.016 
  (0.012) (0.009) (0.025) (0.018) 
Export 0.071*** 0.061*** 0.074*** 0.059*** 
  (0.012) (0.009) (0.025) (0.016) 
Constant 9.974*** 9.952*** 10.598*** 10.482*** 
  (0.098) (0.086) (0.222) (0.169) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R_Squared 0.250 0.230 0.263 0.252 
Obs 13178 13186 3304 3284 
 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level. Note: OLS estimates. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses are clustered at firm level  
 
 
 
 
18	  
	  
Table 3: Effects of Performance Related Pay on Labour Productivity, Wages, and TFP 
(IV Estimates) 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level. Note: All IV estimations are based on the two-step efficient 
GMM estimator and a variance-covariance estimator that is robust to heteroskedasticity (robust standard errors in parentheses). The external 
instruments of the Performance Related Pay that have been used in the first stage are: i) volatility of sales at firm level over period 1999-
2001; ii) volatility of sales at firm level over the period 2002-2004. 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
ln (value 
added per 
capita)  
ln (wage 
per capita) 
ln (value 
added per 
capita)  
ln (wage 
per capita) 
Explanatory Variables a b d e 
Performance Related Pay 1.231*** 0.830*** 1.088*** 0.797*** 
  (0.158) (0.106) (0.232) (0.181) 
ln (physical capital per capita) 0.135*** 0.050*** 0.123*** 0.052*** 
  (0.008) (0.005) (0.014) (0.011) 
Fixed-term contracts_Share -0.134* -0.171*** -0.269 -0.372*** 
  (0.077) (0.061) (0.176) (0.140) 
Executives_share -0.863*** -0.848*** -0.747** -0.696*** 
  (0.164) (0.128) (0.292) (0.223) 
White Collars_share -1.225*** -1.120*** -1.048*** -0.926*** 
  (0.159) (0.124) (0.282) (0.210) 
Women_share -0.151*** -0.223*** -0.255** -0.201*** 
  (0.053) (0.038) (0.102) (0.077) 
Immigrants -0.001 0.001 0.436** 0.283**  
  (0.089) (0.071) (0.189) (0.144) 
Firm's Age -0.004*** -0.001** -0.002* 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Process Innov. -0.051 -0.060*** -0.051 -0.073**  
  (0.044) (0.016) (0.040) (0.030) 
Product Innov. -0.021 -0.007 0.004 -0.003 
  (0.022) (0.014) (0.042) (0.029) 
Export -0.055 -0.022 -0.037 -0.011 
  (0.051) (0.015) (0.041) (0.031) 
Constant 10.485*** 10.525*** 10.077*** 10.095*** 
  (0.177) (0.140) (0.366) (0.277) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Underidentification Test _ p value 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM Statistic) 
Weak Identification Test _ Wald F Stat. 
76.105 74.695 18.172 17.382 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F Satistic) 
Overidentification Test _ p value 
0.256 0.165 0.070 0.778 
(Hansen J Statistic) 
Obs. 6579 6570 2340 2329 
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Table 4: Effects of Performance Related Pay on Labour Productivity, Wages and TFP 
(Three-Stage Estimation for Systems of Simultaneous Equations ) 
 
  All Firms Unionised Firms 
Dependent Variable 
ln (value 
added per 
capita)  
ln (wage per 
capita) 
ln (value 
added per 
capita)  
ln (wage per 
capita) 
Explanatory Variables a b c d 
Performance Related Pay 1.289*** 0.864*** 1.168*** 0.838*** 
  (0.119) (0.081) (0.215) (0.157) 
ln (physical capital per capita) 0.137*** 0.049*** 0.125*** 0.053*** 
  (0.006) (0.004) (0.011) (0.008) 
Fixed-term contracts_Share -0.125** -0.154*** -0.316**  -0.343*** 
  (0.064) (0.043) (0.137) (0.100) 
White Collars_share -0.890*** -0.814*** -0.698*** -0.615*** 
  (0.111) (0.075) (0.232) (0.169) 
Blue Collars_share -1.241*** -1.101*** -0.968*** -0.856*** 
  (0.105) (0.072) (0.222) (0.162) 
Women_share -0.134*** -0.219*** -0.207**  -0.181*** 
  (0.041) (0.028) (0.084) (0.062) 
Immigrants -0.002 0 0.461*** 0.285**  
  (0.074) (0.051) (0.163) (0.118) 
Firm's Age -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.002**  -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Process Innov. -0.055 -0.062*** -0.053 -0.070*** 
  (0.051) (0.014) (0.037) (0.027) 
Product Innov. -0.026 -0.007 -0.011 -0.002 
  (0.020) (0.013) (0.035) (0.026) 
Export -0.053 -0.025 -0.031 -0.019 
  (0.050) (0.020) (0.037) (0.027) 
Constant 10.488*** 10.509*** 9.983*** 10.007*** 
  (0.127) (0.087) (0.284) (0.207) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 6531 2321 
Correlation between equations Corr(a,b)=0.806 Corr(c,d)=0.866 
Wald Test for the coefficient of 
Performance Related Pay  
H0: ln (va per capita) -ln(wage per capita)=0 
Diff.=0.425 Diff.=0.330 
p_value = 0.000 p_value = 0.000 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level. H0 in Wald Test assumes that the differences 
between the coefficients of Performance Related Pay in the productivity and wage equations (0.425 and 0.330 in All firms and 
Unionised Firms, respectively) are not significantly different from zero. The p_value of this test shows that this H0 is rejected. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Variable definition  
 Variable Definition 
Performance Related Pay Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm adopts PRP payments of any kind, 0 otherwise. 
ln (value added per capita) Log of value-added per employee (source AIDA) deflated by the value added deflator (source ISTAT) 
ln (wage per capita) 
Log of wage bill per employee (source AIDA) 
deflated by the consumer price index for blue and 
white collar workers (source ISTAT) 
ln (physical capital per capita) Log of capital stock per employee (source AIDA) deflated by the investment deflator (source ISTAT) 
% executives Percentage of managers and supervisors 
% white collar workers Percentage of white collar workers 
% blue-collar workers Percentage of manual workers  
% women Percentage of women among total workers 
% fixed-term contracts Percentage of fixed-term workers 
% immigrant workers Percentage of workers coming from other countries 
Unions Dummy variable that equals 1 if there is a worker representation of any kind in the firm, 0 otherwise 
Age Age of firms 
Process Innovation Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm adopted process innovations in the last three years, 0 otherwise 
Product Innovation Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm originated new products in the last three years, 0 otherwise 
Export Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm exported in the last three years, 0 otherwise 
ln (Sales volatility)_1999-2001 Logarithm of the standard deviation of sales over the period 1999-2001 
ln (Sales volatility)_2002-2004 Logarithm of the standard deviation of sales over the period 2002-2004 
Firm Size   Logarithm of the number of employees at firm level 
North- West Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localised in North-Western regions, 0 otherwise 
North-East Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localised in North-Eastern regions, 0 otherwise 
Centre Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localised in Central regions, 0 otherwise 
South Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localised in Southern regions, 0 otherwise 
Sectors Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localised in sector shown in table1, 0 otherwise 
Source: RIL Survey, ISFOL  
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Table A.2 Effects of Performance Related Pay on Labour Productivity, Wages and TFP 
(IV Estimates, First Stage) 
 
  All Firms Unionised Firms 
Dependent Variable 2d Stage ln (value added 
per capita)  
ln (wage per 
capita) 
ln (value added 
per capita)  
ln (wage per 
capita) 
Dependent variable 1st Stage Performance Related Pay Performance Related Pay 
Explanatory Variables a b c d 
Sales Volatility 2002_2004 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 
  (0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) 
Sales Volatility 1999_2001 0.033*** 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 
  (0.010) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) 
ln (physical capital per capita) 0.003 -0.002 0.004 0.003 
  (0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) 
Fixed-term contracts_Share 0.052 -0.052 0.037 0.052 
  (0.111) (0.033) (0.112) (0.111) 
White Collars_share -0.316* -0.134** -0.309* -0.316* 
  (0.174) (0.062) (0.177) (0.174) 
Blue Collars_share -0.273 -0.061 -0.264 -0.273 
  (0.169) (0.061) (0.173) (0.169) 
Women_share -0.193*** -0.100*** -0.188*** -0.193*** 
  (0.056) (0.023) (0.056) (0.056) 
Immigrants -0.293* -0.082** -0.298* -0.293* 
  (0.103) (0.038) (0.102) (0.103) 
Firm's Age 0.002** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Process Innov. 0.050** 0.043*** 0.052** 0.050** 
  (0.025) (0.011) (0.025) (0.025) 
Product Innov. 0.022 0.018* 0.018 0.022 
  (0.025) (0.011) (0.025) (0.025) 
Export 0.061** 0.033*** 0.060** 0.061** 
  (0.025) (0.011) (0.025) (0.025) 
Constant -0.136 -0.517*** -0.161 -0.136 
  (0.234) (0.092) (0.237) (0.234) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 6579 6570 2340 2329 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.	  
	  
